

Texas Industrialist Narrates Rescue Mission in Iran



H. Ross Perot

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SYMPOSIUM IN FLORIDA

The 2nd National Intelligence Symposium will be held at the Naples Beach Hotel, Naples, Florida on Monday, February 28, 1983. Symposium co-sponsors are, as last year, the Naples *Daily News*, and Palmer Communications. Theme for this year's symposium is "U.S. Intelligence—The First Line of National Defense."

Four distinguished AFIO members will participate in the morning and afternoon sessions of the symposium. They are: Major-General Richard X. Larkin, U.S. Army (ret), president of AFIO; Admiral Bobby R. Inman, U.S. Navy(ret), former NSA director and deputy director of Central Intelligence, and currently a member of AFIO's board of directors; W. Ray Wannall, retired associate director of the FBI and now chairman of AFIO's board of directors; and Lt-General Eugene F. Tighe, USAF(ret) and member of AFIO's executive committee of its board of directors.

John Anson Smith, AFIO life member, is committee chairman of the symposium. AFIO members desiring further information on attending the symposium may write to Mr. Smith, P.O. Box 2717, Naples, Florida 33939.

An overflow crowd of more than 400 AFIO members and their guests listened spell-bound to H. Ross Perot, the noted Texas industrialist, as he described the thrilling and dangerous rescue of two of his executives of the Electronic Data Systems Inc., from an Iranian prison in 1979. The successful mission was accomplished by a private "special forces" team recruited from among Perot's EDS employees who were former US military personnel.

The team was personally selected by the legendary former Special Forces Colonel, "Bull" Simon, who had retired and was persuaded by Perot to head up the rescue mission, after it was clear that the two senior EDS executives in Iran were being held as hostages for an impossibly high ransom by the new revolutionary regime in Tehran. Perot was determined to attempt a rescue effort of his associates at any cost.

The EDS employees eventually chosen by Colonel Simon for his team were not only volunteers for the dangerous task but all refused to be paid for their unusual service.

Perot, in an hour of tense yet humor-flecked narrative, used color slides to enhance his description of the rescue mission. Among the many nearly unbelievable incidents in the successful mission was the work of Perot's Iranian EDS employees in Tehran who were able to convince the revolutionary committee to rally an enormous mob to storm the prison in which Perot's associates were being held. When the mob beseiged the prison and released its thousands of Iranian prisoners, Perot's two colleagues escaped in the confusion at the same time.

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AFIO Spring Lunch

The AFIO Spring lunch will be held on April 11 at the Ft. Myer Officers' Club, Arlington, Virginia. The speaker has not yet been selected. Further information on the lunch will be mailed to local members in the near future.

FBI Investigations of Potential Internal Threats To US at an All-Time Low, Says AFIO Official

The following article was prepared by AFIO's current chairman of the board of directors, W. Ray Wannall, who was, at his retirement, an associate director of the FBI.

"As of May 15, 1982, the FBI had a total of 43 investigations under the Attorney General Guidelines for Domestic Security. Of this number of investigations, there were 23 organizations and 20 individuals. Of the 23 organizations there were only three under full investigation."

So wrote Judge William H. Webster, Director of the FBI, to Senator Jeremiah Denton (R., Alabama), Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, on June 8, 1982. Senator Denton's subcommittee has oversight responsibility of the FBI for the Senate.

The 43 investigations mentioned by Webster represented the entire commitment of the nation's principal investigative agency to domestic security investigations among a population of more than 230 million. It also represented less than one percent of the 4,868 FBI investigations pending at the beginning of March 1976, one month before then-Attorney General Edward M. Levi promulgated his guidelines and practically foreclosed the nation's internal security program.

The Levi guidelines have been praised by those who favor them, and criticized by those who oppose them, for the same reason: they require a criminal basis for an active investigation. What both protagonists and antagonists overlook is that the FBI's domestic security investigations were conducted on a criminal basis for two and a half years before the guidelines were issued.

The FBI in August 1973 began a review of 21,414 internal security-type cases, then pending, to weed out those involving activities *not* of such a nature as to constitute violations, actual or potential, of specific Federal Statutes. The review was dictated by the repeal on September 25, 1971, of Subchapter II of the Internal Security Act of 1950.

Congress Denounces Communism

Back in 1950, Congress had found, as a result of evidence adduced before various committees of the Senate and House of Representatives, that communism was a world-wide revolutionary movement, "vested in and exercised by the Communist dictatorship of a foreign country," whose purpose it was "by treachery, deceit, infiltration into other groups (governmental and otherwise), espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and any other means deemed necessary, to establish a Communist totalitarian dictatorship in all the countries of the world. . . ."

As we read press reports from Southeast Asia, Africa, Central America and other areas, we realize how this finding by Congress applies equally well today as it did in 1950. What is confusing and difficult to comprehend is why, less than a dozen years ago, our legislators saw fit to denounce this finding by repealing Subchapter II. We must conclude they were swept away on the wave created by the then-popular counter-culture advocates, the anti-war groups, and those who used "McCarthyism"



W. Ray Wannall

as the vilest of all epithets. In time, the same wave obliterated the Senate and House committees which supplied the evidence. If you don't like the doctor's diagnosis, shoot him!

FBI Responsibilities

In passing Subchapter II in 1950, Congress said it was necessary to enact legislation designed to prevent the world-wide communist conspiracy from accomplishing its purpose in the United States. It, therefore, incorporated the following in 50 US Code 811, Paragraph 14:

"The detention of persons who there is reasonable ground to believe probably will commit or conspire with others to commit espionage or sabotage is, in a time of internal security emergency, essential to the common defense and to the safety and security of the territory, the people and the Constitution of the United States."

Charged with responsibility under this statute, the FBI under its Emergency Detention Program (EDP) between 1950 and 1971 undertook thousands of investigations to identify persons and groups of persons who might, in an emergency, pose the type of threat defined by Congress. Its name derived from the title of Subchapter II: "Emergency Detention of Suspected Security Risks."

The bases for EDP investigations could be criminal but frequently were not. Allegations, reasonable suspicions, reports from sources, including the general public, all served as reasons for opening cases during this 21-year period.

When the law giving impetus to these investigations was repealed, the FBI, after consultation with officials of the Department of Justice, undertook a review of the 21,000 cases as they were reactivated for updating, a standard Bureau procedure. By the time Attorney General Levi issued his 1976 guidelines, 16,546 of the investigations had been discontinued and the cases closed. Determinations had been made that the activities of the subjects of the remaining 4,868 cases would, if uninterrupted, lead to violation of one or more specific Federal statutes.

There are in excess of fifty Federal laws impacting on (continued on p. 3)

FBI Inquiries on Internal Threats

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the security of the United States. Three of these formed the bases for most of the 4,868 cases surviving the extensive review. These were codified in the sections of Title 18, US Code, relating to rebellion or insurrection (Section 2383), seditious conspiracy (Section 2384) and advocating the overthrow of government (Section 2385).

The provisions of these particular laws are repugnant to many civil libertarians. Following the Church and Pike committee incursions into the FBI in 1975, the fact that these three enactments of Congress served as bases for many domestic security and intelligence inquiries became publicly known. The three statutes became as unacceptable to those civil libertarians as had been Subchapter II of the Internal Security Act of 1950.

In 1977, a document called "A Law to Control the FBI" was sponsored by three groups which have consistently taken an anti-law enforcement and anti-subversive activities control stand: The Committee for Public Justice, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and The Center for National Security Studies.

The anomalous position taken by such antagonists of domestic security and intelligence reflects an utter disregard for vital sections of our criminal code. They cry out, "If the law permits investigations of actual or potential security risks, repeal the law."

The ACLU continued to voice its objections to use of Federal laws as a basis for subversive activities investigations in June 1979 when, criticizing certain wording in Senate Bill S.1612, a proposed charter for the FBI, it stated:

"(T)he FBI could in the future investigate 'subversive activities' under this section, based on possible violations of sections 2383-85 of Title 18 relating to rebellion and insurrection, seditious conspiracy, and advocacy of the overthrow of the government. . . . These statutes should not be the basis for investigation." (Emphasis added by ACLU)

Levi Guidelines

The Levi guidelines have served as a stopgap, a device which has effectively accomplished the ends of the ACLU and those who support its objectives until such time as the laws they find objectionable can be abrogated. In addition to declaring there must be a criminal basis for each domestic security investigation, Mr. Levi decreed that four factors must be considered by the FBI in determining whether a full investigation should be undertaken:

- (1) the magnitude of the threatened harm;
- (2) the likelihood it will occur;
- (3) the immediacy of the threat; and
- (4) the danger to privacy and free expression posed by a full investigation.

When the Levi rules were applied to the more than 4,000 cases pending, less than 100 were found to qualify for continuing attention.

After two years' experience under the guidelines, on April 20, 1978, the Associate Director of the FBI testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee. He told of a situation where the Attorney General had determined an organization of 71 members intended to overthrow (concluded on p. 6)

Convention '83 at San Diego

Headed by its overall chairman, Lee Echols, the AFIO San Diego convention committee is busily at work planning the many details of AFIO '83 Convention to be held in San Diego, California, on October 14-15.

The official Convention '83 site is the Holiday Inn at the Embarcadero in San Diego. Theme for the Convention will be decided in the near future and will be publicized in the next issue of *Periscope*, at which time futher details on the Convention speakers and schedule will also be made available.

WELCH FUND NEARS GOAL AFTER ONE YEAR

AFIO members will be pleased to learn that the Richard S. Welch Memorial Fund, launched one year ago to encourage the teaching and discussion of intelligence at Harvard University and other institutions, now totals over \$31,000, received from more than 200 donors.

The goal of the drive is \$50,000. Co-chairmen for the drive are John Bross and Christopher May and the list of those associated with the Fund includes Robert Amory, retired Ambassador Taylor Belcher, Ray S. Cline, William E. Colby, Richard M. Helms, Samuel P. Huntington, John M. Maury, David A. Phillips, and Bronson Tweedy.

Specific plans for the Fund are now being drawn up, and include a coordinating role for Harvard University's participation in the national process of understanding and appreciation of intelligence's role in the formation of US foreign policy.

Richard Welch was killed in Athens on December 23, 1975 by unknown assassins while serving as the CIA chief of station there. Those interested in contributing to the Fund in his memory may forward contributions payable to the Richard S. Welch Memorial Fund, and mail them to Dean Bayley Mason, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 79 Boylston Street, Cambridge Mass. 02138. All contributions are tax-deductible.

DCI Speaks in Chicago

Dick Grant, AFIO Montana State Chairman who is also Montana Department Commander of the American Legion, was instrumental in getting the Director of Central Intelligence, William "Bill" Casey, to speak at the American Legion National Convention in Chicago last 24 August. Mr. Casey also met with the AFIO Greater Chicago Chapter for a dinner discussion, on the same date. The talk to the Legionnaires highlighted Casey's concern over the Freedom of Information Act and the need to exempt the Intelligence Community from FOIA. His position received a great deal of publicity and the Legionnaires appear willing to support the need for such an exemption.

On the Intelligence Bookshelf . . .

Current books of interest to intelligence buffs and watchers of the world scene. All reviews are by AFIO members.

Former Nazis in the US

The BELARUS Secret, by John Loftus. Edited by Nathan Miller, Alfred A. Knoff, 1982.

The BELARUS Secret by John Loftus describes the operational use and eventual immigration to the United States of former Nazis (the subject of an expose on "60 minutes" earlier in 1982). Having lost the Gehlen organization (former German Abwehr) to the United States, the British, under former MI-6 Officer and KGB Agent Kim Philby recruited the Communist-infiltrated Abramtchik network. With a plea of lack of funds, Philby "unloaded" Abramtchik as well as the NTS [anti-Soviet National Trade Union] onto the late Frank Wisner while discrediting the warnings of Communist infiltration from Radislaw Ostrowsky as "sour grapes". Philby and the British were provided with the intelligence "take" from this operation.

In addition to Philby, the KGB had Heinz Felfe (Gehlen's liaison to NATO) as an agent able to provide his Soviet masters with Wisner's plans to liberate Eastern Europe. The liberation of Eastern Europe was a policy goal of the administration of President Eisenhower during the 1950's.

Frank Wisner is described as follows: "At the very outset of this country's unforeseen and unprepared role as a major power of the world, he was called upon to break new ground of the most dangerous, and for a major power, the most essential ground. . . . What can never be broken is the image of Frank Wisner left behind with those who worked for him. He was a wise, prudent, yet strongly determined, and deeply American above all". Having worked for Mr. Wisner, I can testify to that statement.

In my opinion, the author described an operation which was a failure but in the aftermath of World War II he fails to analyze problems associated with finding and developing sources behind the Iron Curtain. In a war-weary Europe, the new CIA was beseiged by fabricators, "paper-mills" and double agents "making the rounds". The ability of Kim Philby and Hans Felfe to damage western efforts, as well as the tragic death of Frank Wisner due to health reasons, are felt to this day. Readers should realize that the author fails to have an understanding of problems involved with creating an intelligence network and evaluating information from "denied areas".

Fred H. Adams

Death in the North Atlantic

Battleship Bismarck—A Survivor's Story, by Baron Burkard Von Mullenheim-Rechberg; translated by Jack Sweetman; United States Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1982. 290 pages.

This book, hailed by its publishers as the inside story told by the only surviving officer of the Bismarck, adds little to the volumes of details published immediately after this Naval engagement and since the end of World War II.

If the reader is looking for answers which previous naval analysts have eagerly sought, these answers are not to be found in the author's account of the engagement. The reasons for some of the major actions taken by Fleet Commander Admiral Gunther Lujens to avoid the British Navy after he sank the British battleship Hood are not explained. Since he suffered major damage to his own ship, he must have been aware that in the open Atlantic he faced (which he ultimately did) the total might and wrath of the British Navy, to avenge the sinking of the pride of its service.

Why Lujens did not opt to return to Norway via the Denmark Straits, through which he had just entered the North Atlantic, is still a mystery, even to the author. The retreat through the Straits could have given him air support from Luftwaffe units based in Norway, when Lujens neared their operational range. It is also difficult to understand why there were not more communications and sharing of plans and tactics

Behind-Scenes in WWII

SOE, Recollections and Reflections, 1940-45, by J. G. Beevor, published by The Bodley Head, London, 1981, 269 pp., UK Price £8.95.

Colonel Beevor's book deserves wider attention than it may receive. Few could be more qualified to write what is a concise but comprehensive history of SOE (Special Operations Executive) in all theatres of its activity in the war. Trained in the law, Beevor joined SOE shortly after its establishment in 1940 and rose to a position of executive distinction. In his first assignment, January 1941 – June 1942, he headed an SOE operation to mount a resistance, stay-behind organization in neutral Portugal. He was then appointed assistant for SOE chief Hambro and in 1943-44 was a member of the SOE planning staff. From 1944 to the end of the war he was a general staff officer in charge of plans and operations at the Italian headquarters of Special Operations Mediterranean. After the war, Beevor had another distinguished career as advisor and executive in various international finance agencies and corporations.

This book is more than the memoir of an officer active in several SOE theatres of the war. It is a thorough, deftly-organized history, solidly based on all the available published materials in SOE from many quarters and in several languages. SOE is a succinct survey of Beevor's career as well as a study of the SOE in relationships (sometimes stormy) with other British and with American intelligence services and with government organs. There is material here on SOE operations, with concise and necessary historical backgrounds, in the Balkans, North Africa and Italy, France, Scandinavia, the Netherlands, Germany and Austria, Eastern Europe, South-east Asia and the Far East. There are also sketches of episodes concerning SOE and German secret weapons, and a sensitive analysis of the anti-Nazi opposition and why it failed.

In this reviewer's opinion, it is in the conclusion that the author makes the most vital points. This should be required reading for world leaders concerned about events in the so-called "Third World." On page 227 Beevor writes:

"But ultimately [besides the quality of SOE work in aiding resistance movements, guerrilla warfare and secret armies' action] . . . it was the conditions within the different enemy-occupied countries which made or marred the value of the aid offered. The success of special operations and the prospects for resistance movements were largely determined by the geography of a country, its size, the sparsity or density of its population, the types and locations of frontiers, the ruggedness or flatness of the terrain and whether landlocked or with access to the sea. Nearness to Britain or British bases affected the amount of help that could be sent. The internal climate or spirit inside the occupied country was all-important . . . the paramount factor was the general level of morale."

While supporting resistance movements is different from foreign intervention in foreign civil wars or internationalized crises such as are found today in Central America, Asia and Africa, many of the same principles do apply. And Beevor's wise words of analysis and thought in his conclusion should be carved in granite.

Prof. Douglas L. Wheeler Univ. of New Hampshire

between the Fleet Commander, his Ship's Captain, and one of his Senior Gunnery Officers (the author).

The author's surprise that the British Navy was alert to the planned breakout of the Bismarck via the Denmark Straits or the Faeroes Gap, etc., to raid commerce in the Atlantic is also hard to fathom. The German Intelligence Service was aware that the Bismarck had been spotted, among others, by a Swedish intelligence unit while transiting the Baltic, obviously ready to engage in operations, and that this information probably had been passed on to British Intelligence.

There are many minor interesting items in the book, some already known to the Allies from captured documents. Among these are the transmissions to the Fuehrer by Admiral Lujens from his stricken ship, promising to fight on and affirming his belief in the Fuehrer (*not* the Fatherland).

The details of the sinking of the ship itself, after its fate was obviously sealed by the overwhelming British forces now on the battle scene, highlighted the Germans' disregard for the lives of their own naval personnel. It is difficult to see what was served by providing

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NOTES FROM NATIONAL

- In view of the increase in dues, all members are asked to examine applications for AFIO membership and be sure that they reflect the current amount of \$25 annual dues and \$250 for life membership. Please print in the proper amount of dues in ink if you have old applications.
- We still have AFIO lapel pins for \$5. each and decals for \$1. AFIO Speakers Kits are available for \$5.
- We learned recently that Ladislav Bittman who participated in the AFIO 1980 Convention is teaching a course entitled "Deception", at Boston University's School of Communications. Professor Bittman was asked to comment on relationship of the Bulgarian Intelligence Service to the KGB.
- The current AFIO Directory was prepared at this time in order to give a full calendar year for listings. Members whose applications were received by December 31, 1982 are included in the new Directory unless they requested to be considered restricted members. Address changes which were received by December 31, 1982 have been included in the new Directory. Supplemental listings of new members will be included in future issues of Periscope.
- As members review the new Directory and ascertain that their state has a number of AFIO members, they may wish to consider forming a local chapter. (Experience has shown that about one-third of our AFIO Chapter members are not members of AFIO. We would ask the local groups to check this situation carefully.) If members would like to know the names of the AFIO members in your specific area in order to consider forming a chapter, please write to AFIO headquarters listing the local postal zip codes. We will furnish a machine run of members and addresses in your area. (We do not include the Washington DC Metropolitan Area because the Board of Directors of AFIO decided not to create such a chapter.)

Intelligence Legislation in the New Congress

John Warner, our Legal Advisor, has the following comments on legislation of AFIO interest in the new 98th Congress:

Now that the "Protection of Agent Identities" bill has been enacted into law, what are the prospects for other legislation of intelligence interest in the new Congress? Almost certainly, there will be proposals for amendments to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). AFIO testified in the previous Congress, advocating an amendment to the National Security Act of 1947 (which established CIA) which would provide total exemption from FOIA for CIA, NSA and the FBI and such other intelligence entities as the President may designate. CIA representatives, with the approval of the Administration, also urged similar Congressional action.

Efforts will be renewed to amend the Federal Tort Claims Act to provide that law-suits alleging violation of Constitutional rights may be brought only against the Federal government; Federal employees would thus be relieved of potential personal liability for acts committed in their performance of official duties. AFIO has submitted statements to the appropriate Congressional committees.

It is entirely possible that amendments to the espionage statutes will also be the subject of Congressional hearings. The 1917 espionage laws are inadequate and do not afford classified information the degree of protection required.

AFIO headquarters will keep our members informed on the progress of the above and any other Congressional activity in the field of legislation affecting the intelligence community. Undoubtedly AFIO will again be requested to furnish its views by testifying or by submitting statements on such matters.

Battleship Bismarck (Book Review)

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target practice for the British capital ships and aircraft leading to the slaughter of 2,000 German sailors. Why not scuttle the ship when its fate was sealed, saving the lives of those who wanted to be saved, and letting those who wanted to go down with the ship to do so? The author offers no reason for the decision to fight to the death. Only 115 men were saved out of a complement of more than 2,200!

The author's criticism of the British for not picking up most of the survivors is ironic in view of the German Navy's stated doctrine: not to endanger their fighting ships by picking up survivors of enemy merchant ships sunk without warning. The author, even after 40 years have elapsed, seems to have two standards—one for the Germans and another for their enemies.

As previously stated, this book answers few of the still unanswered questions and among them why a firsthand witness to a Naval incident now portrayed as such an epic event waited 40 years to write his story.

William Hunt

Texas Industrialist Narrates Rescue Mission in Iran

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The saga of how these two men, escorted by Colonel Simon and his rescue team, traveled 500 perilous miles westward across Iran to the Turkish border in stolen Iranian vans, facing constant road-blocks and dangers, had a never-never quality for the intent AFIO audience of professional former intelligence operatives.

Perot, a graduate of the US Naval Academy in 1953 and currently a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, is heavily involved with a number of national groups such as the Boy Scouts of America. At the close of his talk, he was given a standing ovation by his AFIO audience.

Donations

Col. George Combs Berger, USAF(Ret) Alexandria, VA

Mr. Forrest S. Cox Waco, TX

The Honorable Hugh S. Cumming, Jr. Washington, DC

Mrs. Charlotta P. Engrav Arlington, VA

Mrs. Jeanne B. Griffith Evanston, II

Edward M. Gunn, M.D. Hilton Head Island, SC

The Honorable Clare Boothe Luce Washington, DC

Mr. Frank Pokrop, III Lake Forest, IL

Miss F. Catherine Rigsbee Saludo, NC

COL Edward Joseph Rudka, SMR San Francisco, CA

Mr. Lee O. Teague Oklahoma City, OK

Industrial Associates

ENSCO, Inc. Springfield, VA

Virtually No FBI Security Inquiries

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the Government by force or violence. Since its activities were then restricted to recruiting members and publishing aims, the FBI applied the "magnitude of harm," the "likelihood of harm" and the "immediacy" tests and concluded that there was no authority to continue the investigation.

The FBI official pointed out there were organizations which intended to overthrow our government but had not yet moved from first-amendment-protected activity of advocating such. Not only was an investigation precluded, he explained, but the FBI could not maintain information on such groups.

"We certainly do not want to give any false assurances," he said, "that we may be able to prevent certain types of activities which could be prevented under broader guidelines."

This statement seems to have made little impression on the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1978. Frankly, I found it somewhat alarming then. My alarm is not lessened by the May, 1982, report that the FBI was conducting only three full-time investigations on organizations considered to represent a security threat to our country and its people.

Some people became so obsessed with the threatening signs and portents of George Orwell's "1984" that by 1983 we have permitted the compass to swing 180 degrees.

A sensible solution must be found.

In Memoriam

Col. Frank S. Clewett San Diego, CA

The Honorable Gordon Gray Washington, DC

Mr. Joseph F. Havas Williamsville, NY

Mrs. Virginia L. Thorne Washington, DC

Mr. John L. Topping Washington, DC

House Oversight Committee Report Card

The latest Annual Report by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (97th Congress) has just been published. We re-print two excerpts from this report of special interest to our AFIO readers:

Covert Action Activity

Another subject which is handled directly by the full Committee is the covert action program of the Central Intelligence Agency. In 1974, the Congress passed the Hughes-Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act which prohibited the expenditure of funds "by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency for operations in foreign countries, other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, unless and until the President finds that each such operation is important to the national security and reports, in a timely fashion, a description and scope of such operation to the appropriate committees of the Congress, including the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States House of Representatives." "Operations . . . other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence," constitute the covert action program of the CIA, i.e., propaganda, paramilitary and political actions.

Over the next few years, the "appropriate committees of the Congress" came to eight in number. The CIA became reluctant to report its sensitive operations to so many committees, a concern shared by many members of both the House and Senate. In 1980, the Committee recommended, and the 96th Congress approved, an amendment to the Hughes-Ryan amendment that reduced reporting of sensitive intelligence activities (both collection and covert action activities) only to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees.

Since the responsibility on the House side for monitoring the covert actions of the CIA now rests principally with the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in the House, all members of the Committee share equally that responsibility. Thus, the full Committee meets and receives reports on all Presidential findings and on the nature and scope of each operation in support thereof.

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News from Chapters

Arizona

On December 4, the following were elected officers of the Arizona Chapter: president, LtCol John S. Masterson, USAF(ret); vice president, Lloyd George Wiggins; secretary-treasurer, Robert S. Moy.

California

San Francisco Bay Chapter. On October 20, Joseph P. Russionello, US Attorney, spoke to the Chapter. On November 17, the Chapter was addressed by Mr. Mike Zinck, FBI offical and Legal Attache at the US Embassy in Paris for the past 10 years. He spoke about the FBI's foreign liaison programs and the current terrorist situation in Europe.

Colorado

Rocky Mountain Chapter. This newly formed Chapter has as president E.H. "Hank" Knoche, and secretary/treasurer Dixon Harris (see adjacent photo). Last October 23, the Chapter heard Brig. General Sidney Gritz, USA(ret), who spoke on the theme "Has the US Press Given Israel Fair Treatment in its Coverage of the Lebanese Fighting?"

Florida

Suncoast Chapter. Lieut-General Rolland V. Heiser, USA(ret) was guest speaker at the Chapter's luncheon meeting in Sarasota, Florida last November 18. His topic was "The Crucial Role of Intelligence to NATO Military Commanders". General Heiser's last active duty assignment before his 1978 retirement was Chief of Staff, US European Command, under General Haig.

Hawaii

Diamond Head Chapter. Speaker on January 28 was USAF Maj-Gen. James Pfautz, J-2 (intelligence) for the US Pacific Command who talked informally on the military intelligence community in the Pacific Basin.

Montana

Western Montana Chapter. At its December 10 meeting, the Chapter elected the following as its officers: president, Tom Nicholson; vice president, E. Terrill Nobles; secretary-treasurer, Norman Larum. Richard A. "Dick" Grant remains AFIO chairman for Montana.

New York

Greater New York Chapter. On December 7, in Bronx, NY, the Chapter and its invited guests from Veterans of OSS, heard William E. Colby, former CIA director, speak on the topic "Negotiating With the Soviets".

Texas

Gulf Coast Chapter. Edward J. O'Malley, Assistant Director FBI, was guest speaker last November 10 in Houston. He spoke on the theme "Hostile Intelligence Activity in the US".

Lone Star Chapter. The following Chapter officers for 1982-83 were elected on November 5: president, LtCol Stanley D. Sagan (USAF,ret); vice president, LtCol Thomas Bresnehen (USAR,ret); and secretary/treasurer, LTC William J. Hammond (AUS,ret).



AFIO in Colorado. L. to R.: Dixon Harris, Secy-Treasurer, and E.H. "Hank" Knoche, President of the Rocky Mountain Chapter.

House Oversight Committee

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It is important to note that the law does not provide that the President seek Committee approval of each covert action. It only requires him to report those actions to the Committee. The reporting requirement, however, does open up a dialogue between the Director of Central Intelligence, who usually briefs the Committee on each Presidential finding, and Committee members, who provide their reactions supportive or negative to such findings. As a last resort, if a majority of the members object to a specific covert action, they can vote to cut off or limit the authorization of funds for it.

Oversight and Evaluation Subcommittee

This Subcommittee carries the primary responsibility on behalf of the full Committee for assuring that the intelligence community provides "informed and timely intelligence" to those in the executive and legislative branches who are responsible for making judgments affecting the national security. In carrying out that task, the Subcommittee reviews the analytic products of the intelligence agencies for quality and aptness. Subcommittee members and staff meet frequently with key users of those intelligence products to gain assessments of their quality and timeliness.

The Subcommittee, for example, carefully examined in early 1981 an important national estimate being produced on international terrorism. That estimate was drafted in a highly charged atmosphere surrounding public statements by Administration leaders and widely published press accounts regarding the Soviet role in promoting international terrorism. At the conclusion of that examination, the Subcommittee Chairman wrote to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence calling the final version of the estimate "a very high quality product." The estimate concluded that the Soviets are deeply engaged in support of revolutionary violence which "frequently entails acts of international terrorism."

In 1982, the Subcommittee staff produced a report evaluating intelligence production on Central America. For several years, the Subcommittee staff carefully monitored intelligence production on Central America. Based on this, a staff report was written praising intelligence for considerable achievements but also expressing concern about occasional weaknesses. The Subcommittee also looked into allegations of improper and illegal activities on the part of intelligence services and satisfied itself that, where necessary, effective actions were taken to remedy the situation.

FROM THE PRESIDENT'S DESK

The unholy alliance between the state secret police (KGB) and the Soviet armed forces which led to the succession to the Soviet throne by Yuri Andropov poses a special threat to our U.S. intelligence forces whose responsibility is to preserve our national security. We now have, as head of the most powerful and aggressive nation in Europe and Asia, an accomplished, experienced master of deceit and deception. Andropov's credentials are, indeed, impressive and range from savage acts of internal suppression to the more sophisticated use of weapons disguised as umbrellas for assassinations abroad.

If in his ascendancy through the senior ranks, his KGB operatives became less ham-handed, so too did their operations become more sinister, better coordinated, more efficient. We can credit Andropov with:

- the magnificent orchestration of the anti-neutron bomb movement in Europe and its coordination with the well-timed but intensive diplomatic demarches in every major capital of the world.
- the tireless persecution of his own countrymen seeking to practice their religious beliefs or freedom of expression, as well as those associated with monitoring, in name only, adherence to the Helsinki Agreement to which the USSR is a signatory.
- the annexation of hospital mental wards by his Lyublyanka, and with the organization and direction of the remarkably successful anti-TNF (Theater Nuclear Forces) campaign.
- the extraordinary fact that only the deployment of U.S. nuclear missiles was challenged in Europe while the presence of Soviet SS-4, SS-5 and SS-20 missiles was generally ignored.
- a major role in the subjugation by threat, force and proxy of the entire Polish nation. And there is a mounting conviction that the attempted assassination of Poland's pride, Pope John Paul II, may ultimately be traced to Andropov's KGB.
- energizing the World Peace Council to light the embers of the nuclear freeze movement and to blow on these embers at propitious times.

Andropov has shown his amoral willingness to use any trick in the bag to gain his objective and has displayed a bag brimming with active measures, surrogate agents, proxy organizations, clever diplomacy, Madison Avenue PR, as well as the usual tricks of the KGB trade. Whatever lies in the future, we may be sure of one thing: with Yuri Andropov, no holds are barred.

Convention Casualty

We have learned to our sadness that AFIO associate member Joseph F. Havas, of Williamsville, New York, was killed last September 30 in an automobile accident while driving to our 1982 AFIO convention. Mr. Havas was also a member of the National Military Officers Association. He was a security consultant in Williamsville prior to his death.



AFIO President, MG Richard X. Larkin, USA(Ret.)

Periscope Classified Section

(As a service to members, PERISCOPE offers its pages without charge to advertise services and reunions. This service is limited to members only and will be printed only once.)

CIC Convention

Former Army Counter Intelligence Corps members — Reunion planned at Orlando, FL, 26-30 October 1983. Contact: Richard B. Snyder, 1567 Heather Way, Kissimmee, FL 32741, (305) 846-3128.

OSS Veterans' Convention

The OSS Veterans' Detachment 101 is scheduled to take place in San Diego from 8-10 October 1983. Anyone interested in futher information on the reunion should contact Mr. Thomas N. Moon, 2604 East Washington, Orange, California 92669.

Defense Intel School Position

DIA is looking for a visiting professor in strategic and national intelligence to teach at its Defense Intelligence School in Washington, DC for the year July 83 - July 84. Ph.D. in government or international relations is mandatory as is college-level teaching experience. Salary at GS-14/5 (\$41,277 to \$63,115). Send SF-171 or detailed resume to Defense Intelligence Agency, Civilian Personnel Operations Division, Recruitment Office (Dept. V-1), Washington, DC 20301.

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